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Chapter 4
On Touch and Life in the De Anima
Christopher P. Long 
Remember that you, dependent on your sight,
do not realize how many things are tangible.
Helen Keller, The World I Live In1
Between the beautiful things with which the De Anima begins and the tongue 
with which it ends, we come into contact with an account of touch in which 
the very nature of perceiving is felt. “Of beautiful things” the De Anima begins 
as it embarks upon an inquiry into the soul that concludes with a gesture to 
the tongue and its capacity to “signify something to another.”2 A certain way of 
knowing is the beautiful thing with which the De Anima, like the Physics and 
the Metaphysics, begins; and as with those texts, so with this, vision seems to 
be the focus of it. Where the De Anima says “τὴν εἴδησιν” and goes on to suggest 
that insight into the nature of the soul is beautiful because it is both precise and 
wondrous, the Physics and the Metaphysics say “τὸ εἰδέναι” and speak in turn of 
a path of inquiry from what is more familiar to us to what is first by nature, 
and of the delight we take in our capacity to see which “of all the powers of 
perceiving, makes us recognize things and brings to light many differences.”3 
Yet between the “beautiful things” with which the De Anima begins and the 
tongue with which it ends, we encounter the aporia of touch that threatens to 
subvert the primacy of sight. The tongue appears here in the middle as well, 
though not as the organ of speech, but as the very flesh by which we enter into 
1   Helen Keller, The World I Live in (New York, 1908), p. 7.
2   Aristotle, De Anima, 402a1, 435b24–25. All translations from the Greek are my own. The ques-
tion of the unity of the De Anima is not insignificant here, but not much depends on whether 
the book was fully complete for publication in Aristotle’s time. Rather, what is of interest is 
the text that has been inherited and the form in which it has been handed down. Martha 
Nussbaum challenges the best argument for the disunity of the De Anima, though she insists 
that the third book is “internally a mess.” See Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty, eds., 
Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford, 1995), p. 6. Ross recognizes that “[t]he plan of the De 
Anima is to a large extent a clear and well thought-out one.” He goes on to point out that 
the manuscript of Book III is “less carefully prepared for publication than that of the earlier 
books.” See Aristotle, De Anima, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford, 1961), pp. 12 and 14.
3   See Aristotle, Physics, 184a10–18. See too Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a21–7.
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intimate connection with the world. If at the beginning and in the end, the 
De Anima articulates a path of inquiry that takes its bearings from the beauti-
ful things said concerning the soul and finds its voice in the eloquence of the 
human tongue, in the middle, we are made to feel the poignant aporia of touch 
and to experience the possibility that our inquiry might ultimately lose its way.
This inquiry into the nature of the soul, which itself is said to “contribute 
greatly toward all truth, and especially toward the truth concerning nature,” 
proceeds along a familiar peripatetic path. Aristotle points to it in the De 
Anima when he writes:
While inquiring concerning the soul it is at the same time [ἅµα] neces-
sary, while going through the impasses through which we must pass if 
we are going to move forward, to take along with us [συµπαραλαµβάνειν] 
the opinions of all our predecessors who declared something concern-
ing the soul, so that we might take hold of the things that have been said 
beautifully while, if something was not said beautifully, we might beware 
of these.4
Already here, as at the end, the tongue, with its capacity to signify something 
to another, is felt to bear upon the well-being of the inquiry itself. This peri-
patetic path unfolds as legomenology in its most familiar guise: the attempt 
to articulate the truth by attending carefully to the things said well by those 
who came before.5 Book I of the De Anima is thus no prologue preceding but 
fundamentally divorced from the inquiry itself; rather, it is a prolegomenon 
in the more literal sense in which the inquiry itself proceeds as a collabora-
tive endeavor between those who came before and we who continue to seek 
the truth concerning the nature of the soul. Thus, Aristotle’s own peripatetic 
legomenology opens a determinate path for us into the received text; for if his 
inquiry proceeds in collaboration with his predecessors, ours ought also to pro-
ceed by attending carefully to the things Aristotle himself said beautifully even 
if we too must beware when something is not so said. The adverb, “καλῶς,” here 
as throughout the De Anima, modifies a particular way of speaking, which is 
said to be beautiful precisely because it articulates something of the truth. The 
adverb itself appears most often in the De Anima in contexts in which Aristotle 
4   Aristotle, De Anima, 403b20–24.
5   For a more detailed discussion of legomenology as a peripatetic methodology, see 
Christopher P. Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth (New York, 2011), pp. 6–11.
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is concerned to determine the truth of the things his predecessors said.6 
The intimate connection between the nature of truth toward which the inquiry 
into the soul contributes and the beauty of speech is amplified when Aristotle, 
rehearsing the opinions of those who came before at the end of the first book, 
suggests that “from the things having been said, it is clear that . . . the soul is 
not beautifully [καλῶς] or truly [ἀληθῶς] said to move itself.”7 Articulating the 
identity of the beautiful and the true here, Aristotle gives voice to the man-
ner in which truth appears as something beautifully signified by the tongue. 
The beauty of truth and the truth of beauty animate the inquiry that is the 
De Anima.
But if the truth of this text may be felt by attending to what it articulates 
beautifully, then to find a way forward through the aporia of touch that appears 
in the middle of the text, we will need to pursue a peripatetic legomenology 
of our own in relation to the things we have inherited from Aristotle. Such a 
path will require a certain way of attending to the text, one caught up as much 
in a tangible as in an auditory metaphor of inquiry; for legomenological atten-
tion is rooted in the etymology of the Latin ad-tenděre, to stretch toward, and 
points in this way as much to a gesture of touch as to a way of listening. We have 
already heard the manner in which the opening lines of the Metaphysics spoke 
of knowing in visual terms, but its first sentence also articulates beautifully the 
way the intentionality even of the visual practice of “τὸ εἰδέναι” is rooted in a 
gesture of touch. That most famous text speaks of a kind of stretching out that, 
when expressed as it is there in the middle voice, becomes the very articula-
tion of desire: “All human beings by nature stretch themselves out [ὀρέγονται] 
6   See, for example, Aristotle De Anima, 407a3, where the Timaeus is criticized for calling the 
soul a magnitude; 414a19, where those who think the soul is neither without body nor is 
a body speak beautifully; 415b28 and 416a2, where Empedocles is criticized for failing to 
speak beautifully of the “up” and the “down”; 417b8; 419a15, where Democritus is criticized 
for saying that what is between the eye and the thing seen is empty; 426a20, where earlier 
φυσιολόγοι are criticized for supposing that there is no color without seeing, or flavor without 
tasting. The use of καλῶς in close connection with verbs of saying in these contexts is often 
covered over by translations that emphasize correctness. Barnes regularly translates such for-
mulations as “misrepresents” (419a15) and “mistaken” (426a20); while even Sachs falls into it 
at 407a3, 417b10 and 419a15, translating καλῶς, as “right” in the first two instances and “rightly” 
in the last. See Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, NJ, 1984), vol. 1. 
Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection (Santa Fe, 2001). Such trans-
lations are not strictly wrong; they simply fail to articulate beautifully the manner in which 
Aristotle writes of beauty in relation to articulation.
7   Aristotle, De Anima, 411a24–26.
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toward knowing.”8 The middle voice of the Greek ὀρέγεσθαι, “to stretch 
out toward something,” comes to mean “to desire,” and thus already beautifully, 
if implicitly, articulates the intimate connection between touch and desire that 
will, in the De Anima, be said to differentiate the perceptive powers of animal 
life from all other living things.9
The intentionality of the peripatetic legomenology we must then here pur-
sue is more tangible and auditory than it is visual; for it involves stretching 
ourselves out toward the phenomenon of touch as it is said in the text so that 
we might come to feel the contours of the aporia of touch in the middle. There 
Aristotle finds his way forward blocked by the phenomenon of touch which 
seems itself out of touch with those powers of perceiving that operate at a 
distance and through a proper medium. Attending thus to the ways touch is 
said in the De Anima leads first to the boundary between the nutritive and 
perceptive soul which, marked as it is by the presence of touch, suggests the 
intimacy of our connection with the nutritive dimensions of life and the very 
elements of things. As the primal power of perceiving, touch continues to make 
its presence felt as Aristotle speaks in turn of the distal powers of perceiving, 
first of seeing, then of hearing and smelling, before turning, in the middle, to 
those powers of perceiving that operate by touch. With taste and touch we 
come into contact with an aporia that threatens the unity of Aristotle’s account 
of perceiving itself. By attending carefully to these texts, and specifically, to 
the things Aristotle says concerning the nature of touch, its organ, the flesh, 
and the ambiguity of its medium, we are returned to the things Aristotle says 
about the nature of perceiving itself and made to feel the intimate connec-
tion we have with the world in and with which we live. And so in the end, by 
attending to the ways Aristotle speaks beautifully about touch, we arrive at 
an account of life and death itself in terms of the presence of our capacity 
to touch; for if by touch we first feel our way into life, it is by touch that life 
slips ultimately away from us. By following the itinerary of touch, we come into 
more intimate contact with the contours of animal life itself.
1 Living Said in Many Ways
In a text aptly titled On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida gives voice 
to the peculiar manner in which touch is at once set apart from the other 
8   Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a21.
9   Aristotle, De Anima, 413b1–414a3.
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 powers of perceiving in the De Anima and yet also remains intimately con-
nected with the most primordial elements of life:
While Peri psuchēs is thus a treatise on the pure life of the living, it recur-
rently accords to touch a status that sets it apart. Touch may well exist 
apart from the other senses, but Aristotle stresses that without it, no 
other sense would exist. As has been noted, all animals possess this sense, 
which is also the sense of nutrition.10
Aristotle’s attempt to articulate the nature of the soul, itself “a sort of principle 
of living beings,” at once throws the phenomenon of touch into sharp relief 
and sets it into intimate connection with the nutritive capacity of the soul that 
characterizes the most basic forms of life.11 Touch appears thematically for the 
first time in the De Anima in II.2, as Aristotle seeks to articulate the nature of 
life itself by distinguishing ensouled from soulless beings.12 Thus he begins: 
πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγοµένου—
Living is said in many ways, and if any one of the following is present in 
something, we say that it lives, for example thought, the power to per-
ceive, motion and stand still with respect to place, in addition motion 
according to nourishment, and wasting away as well as growth.13
10   Jacques Derrida, On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford, 2005), p. 24.
11   Aristotle, De Anima, 402a6–7. Aristotle writes of the soul: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων. 
Commenting on this phrase, Polansky writes “[i]n saying that soul is principle τῶν 
ζῴων, Aristotle’s usual term for animals (see 403b18 and subsequently) where we might 
expect him to say living things, Aristotle leaves us in some perplexity regarding his mean-
ing.” He goes on to suggest: “Thus the use of the term ζῴoν [sic] may highlight the impreci-
sion of the understanding of soul preceding Aristotle. Whether animals or living beings 
generally are at issue, soul as a principle will be the nature of the ensouled being and have 
special dignity.” See Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima (New York, 2007), p. 37. Above 
the term is translated “living being” to hold something of the ambiguity between living 
things and animals, the distinction between which is based upon the capacity to touch.
12   There is a brief mention of touching already in Aristotle, De Anima, 403a10–16, where 
Aristotle rehearses the aporiai associated with the embodiment of the soul and sug-
gests that although a straight line touches a sphere at a point, no separated straight line 
will touch a bronze sphere in this way. Ross suggests that passage means to emphasize 
that a perceptible line “would touch the sphere not at a point but over a small area.” See 
Aristotle, De Anima, ed. Ross, p. 168.
13   Aristotle, De Anima, 413a22–25.
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In delineating the nature of life, Aristotle attends to the ways living is said. The 
principle of the inquiry, the point from which it begins, is legomenological: the 
many ways living is said puts us in touch with the contours of life itself.
The way living is said here articulates a definitive movement toward the roots 
of life. Beginning with the life of the mind, Aristotle touches upon perceiving 
and locomotion in order ultimately to arrive at a discussion of nourishment, 
where the boundary between ensouled and soulless beings is encountered. 
Plants and other vegetative life grow and die here where they are said to live 
precisely because they have the fundamental capacity for nourishment, τροφή. 
Thus the passage locates the very roots of life in the capacity to take in food.14 
Having thus marked the boundary between living and non-living things, 
Aristotle articulates a difference between those beings that simply live, and 
animals, which “live first [πρώτως] through the power to perceive [αἴσθησις].”15 
This distinction between living things and animals, however, is marked not 
by a general ability to perceive, but by the specific capacity to touch. Again, 
Aristotle relies upon the ways we speak about the things we encounter:
For even the things that don’t move or alter their place, if they have the 
power to perceive, we say they are animals [ζῷα] and not only that they 
live [ζῆν]. But of the powers of perceiving, touch first [πρῶτον] inheres in 
them all, and just as the capacity for nourishment is able to be separated 
from touch and the other powers of perceiving, so too is touch [able to be 
separated] from the other powers of perceiving.16
The passage first draws the distinction between animal life and other living 
things by attending to the ways living is said; and it then goes on to articu-
late the nature of touch in striking parallel to the capacity for nourishment. As 
nourishment marks the boundary between living and non-living beings, touch 
marks the boundary between animals and all other living beings. Aristotle’s 
repeated iterations of “πρῶτος” in this context suggest that the primacy of 
touch is primal because, as Jean-Louis Chrétien suggests, “it is through and 
through primal for life.”17 But touch here is also heard to be primal because it 
14   Aristotle, De Anima, 413a31–2. Aristotle here says that this capacity to take in food can be 
separated from the other capacities of life, although they cannot be separated in mortals 
from the capacity for nourishment.
15   Aristotle, De Anima, 413b2.
16   Aristotle, De Anima, 413b2–7.
17   The entire quotation from Jean-Louis Chrétien is: “Touch is not primitive because sup-
posedly coarse and required as a basis for the higher senses, but because it is through and 
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is the power of perceiving most intimately connected to the capacity for nour-
ishment. This intimacy sets it apart from the more distal powers of perceiving 
endemic to animal life—the powers of seeing, hearing and smelling, though it 
brings it yet closer to the power of tasting, which itself is said to be “a certain 
sort of touch.”18 Here again the importance of the tongue makes itself felt.
The intimate connection between touch and nutritive life finds further 
articulation in II.3, where Aristotle emphasizes the manner in which touch is 
bound intimately up with appetite, the most rudimentary expression of desire. 
Where II.2 spoke of locomotion, growth and decay, II.3, begins with nutrition, 
perceiving and the capacity to desire.19 Touch, it seems, awakens animal life to 
desire. Aristotle puts it this way:
If there is the power to perceive, so too is there the power to desire; for 
desire [ὄρεξις] is longing [ἐπιθυµία] and spiritedness [θυµός] and wish 
[βούλησις], while all animals have at least one of the powers of perceiv-
ing, that of touch, and in that in which the power of perceiving inheres, 
there are also pleasure and pain and the sense of the pleasant and the 
through primal for life.” See Jean-Louis Chrétien, The Call and the Response (New York, 
2004), p. 98. Perhaps the formulation could be slightly qualified to suggest that touch is 
primal for animal life, as nourishment is for vegetative life. In a beautiful essay on the sci-
ence of touch, Frederick Sachs articulates the primal nature of touch this way: “Touch, in 
short, is the core of sentience, the foundation for communication with the world around 
us, and probably the single sense that is as old as life itself.” See Frederick Sachs, “The 
Intimate Sense: Understanding the Mechanics of Touch,” Sciences 28/1 (1988), 28–34, 
here: p. 28.
18   Aristotle, De Anima, 422a8. In his discussion of intemperance in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle calls the pleasures associated with touch “slavish” and “bestial” because it “is 
present in us not insofar as we are human, but insofar as we are animals.” See Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1118a23–b3. See Pavlos Kontos, “Akolasia as Radical Ethical Vice: The 
Evidence of NE 1140b11–21,” Ancient Philosophy 29/2 (2009), 337–347, here: p. 339.
19   Aristotle, De Anima, 414a31–2. The manner in which the discussion of desire unfolds is 
significant. Delineating the powers of the soul, Aristotle says: “The powers we are say-
ing are the capacity for nutrition, perceiving, desiring, motion with respect to place and 
thinking things through.” The passage mirrors that in 413a23–5, although there he moved 
from thinking to the various kinds of κίνησις, emphasizing particularly those motions—
locomotion, growth and decay—associated with life processes. Here Aristotle includes 
the capacity to desire and, instead of speaking simply of νοῦς, he emphasizes a specific 
kind of thinking, διανοητικόν. The shift in direction and the introduction of desire and the 
capacity to think things through introduce the shift in focus from life to animal life.
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painful; and where these are, there also is longing [ἐπιθυµία], which is the 
desire [ὄρεξις] for the pleasant.20
Desire, itself a certain way of reaching out to the world, is animated by our 
capacity to touch. The world first appears as pleasant or painful by way of 
touch. Thus, it is also in this context that the phenomenon of being appeared 
to, or φαντασία, becomes an issue of explicit concern.21 Already in II.2, Aristotle 
had said that with the power of perceiving comes φαντασία and ὄρεξις.22 
However, here in II.3, Aristotle’s thinking concerning the connection between 
φαντασία and perceiving appears itself to be in transition; for here although he 
says that “living beings having touch also have desire,” he goes on to say “it is 
unclear whether they must also have φαντασία” and by the time II.3 is brought 
to a conclusion, Aristotle simply asserts that some animals “do not even have 
φαντασία.”23 In the end, of course, Aristotle navigates a safe passage concerning 
the relationship between animal life, perception and φαντασία, when, in III.10–
11, he articulates the difference between perceptive and deliberative φαντασία, 
seeming thus to reaffirm his original intuition that all animal life is informed 
by a certain φαντασία.24 This original intuition comes to language already De 
Anima II.2–3, where our capacity to be appeared to is said to be animated by 
our capacity for touch.
The world presents itself to us as something of value for us by way of 
touch. The connection is visceral and elemental, for it involves our deepest 
desire to sustain ourselves in existence, to seek from the world what might 
permit us to remain in and of the world. Our intimate relationship with the 
world unfolds at this most primal and even pre-elemental level. If, for Aristotle, 
the elements are four—fire, air, water and earth—these elements themselves 
are said to be composed of opposing principles: fire, of the dry and hot; air, 
of the hot and moist; water, of the moist and cold; earth of the cold and dry.25 
20   Aristotle, De Anima, 414b1–6.
21   For a discussion of how best to translate φαντασία in Aristotle, see Long, Aristotle on the 
Nature of Truth, pp. 82, 131–137. The locution of “being appeared to” is inspired by K. Lycos, 
“Aristotle and Plato on ‘Appearing’,” Mind 73 (1964), 496–514.
22   Aristotle, De Anima, 413b22–3.
23   See Aristotle, De Anima, 414b15–6; 415a11, respectively.
24   Aristotle, De Anima, 433b29–434a10. For a good discussion of the difference between 
perceptive and deliberative φαντασία, see C. D. C. Reeve, Action, Contemplation, and 
Happiness (Cambridge Mass., 2012), pp. 181–186. See too Long, Aristotle on the Nature of 
Truth, pp. 86–92.
25   See Montgomery Furth, Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(Cambridge, 1988), p. 77. See too De Generatione et Corruptione, 330b22. The order in 
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The world itself unfolds as these pre-elemental principles play in relation to 
one another; fire becoming air as it moistens, air becoming water as it cools, 
and water becoming earth as it dries. We are nourished by the playful unfolding 
of the world, participating with it at this pre-elemental level by way of touch.26 
Thus, Aristotle says “touch is the power to perceive food, for all animals are 
nourished by what is dry or moist and hot or cold, of which the power to per-
ceive is touch, whereas of the other things it is incidentally.”27 This passage 
reinforces the intimate connection between animal life and the pre-elemental 
unfolding of the world, anticipating already what will be emphasized at the 
end of the De Anima, namely, that “it is necessary for the body of the animal to 
be capable of touch, if the animal is going to preserve itself.”28
Here also, however, something of the aporia of touch that will be poignantly 
felt in the middle of the De Anima is suggested, for the proper objects of touch 
seem to put it in touch with an overabundance of contraries. This, its excessive 
nature, sets touch apart from the other proper powers of perceiving, as Aristotle 
says explicitly when he turns his full attention to touch in De Anima II.11:
For every power of perceiving seems to have one pair of contraries; for 
example, sight is of white and black, hearing is of high and deep pitch 
and taste of bitter and sweet, but there are many pairs of contraries in 
what is tangible: hot/cold, dry/moist, hard/soft, and how ever many oth-
ers there are of this sort.29
In reaching out to the world, touch, the power of desire itself, exposes us to an 
excessive plurality of contraries that give us an intimate feel for things even as 
which these contraries are articulated is designed to illustrate the manner in which 
the elements are able to change into one another by virtue of a change in one of their 
contraries so long as the other contrary remains stable as the underlying middle term 
of the transition. So, for example, earth can become fire when it is heated because they 
share the dimension of dryness.
26   Karen Barad takes this idea a step yet further when she speaks of touching as what matter 
itself does: “In an important sense, in a breathtakingly intimate sense, touching, sensing, 
is what matter does, or rather, what matter is: matter is condensations of response-ability. 
Touching is a matter of response.” See Karen Barad, “On Touching—The Inhuman That 
Therefore I Am,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 23/3 (2012), 206–223, 
here: p. 215. For a discussion of truth as response-ability in Aristotle, see Long, Aristotle on 
the Nature of Truth, pp. 14–15.
27   Aristotle, De Anima, 414b7–10.
28   Aristotle, De Anima, 434b12–13.
29   Aristotle, De Anima, 422b23–27.
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they refuse to consolidate into a proper object. Touch, it seems, never easily 
offers us something to grasp; its surplus, rooted in a desire to stretch out toward 
the world, ensures at once that the world in relinquishing itself to us remains 
also always elusive.30
Thus, by touch we come to experience the recalcitrance of things that belies 
the delusion that the world is simply at our disposal. Touch exposes us to a sur-
plus we cannot grasp. It opens us to the supposition that our intimate connec-
tion with the world puts us at its disposal. If by touch the world presents itself 
as something of value for us, by touch too we come to experience ourselves as 
something of value for the world. The reciprocal nature of touch awakens us to 
our deepest ecological responsibilities. This will be felt more acutely as we tra-
verse further along the itinerary of touch Aristotle charts in the De Anima, for 
the peculiar reciprocity of touch, what Merleau-Ponty has called its “reversibil-
ity,” puts us in touch with a dimension of perceiving that is eclipsed by the dis-
tal powers of perception.31 Before turning, however, to the heuristics of touch 
itself, it is necessary to turn first, as Aristotle does, to those distal powers of per-
ceiving that lend determination to the nature and function of perceiving itself.
2 Touch and Other Proper Powers of Perceiving
Once Aristotle has located the difference between animals and other liv-
ing things in the capacity to perceive, and more specifically, in the capacity 
to touch, he outlines the basic contours of the power of perceiving itself. He 
begins, strangely enough, by making a kind of retreat; for although the inquiry 
to this point has focused on the powers of the soul, Aristotle insists that it is 
necessary to say what the activities and the actions themselves are first, and 
prior to this even, to examine their objects.32 Here, however, the power of 
touch recedes below the surface, for as mentioned, the nature of its activity and 
30   Throughout his article on touch and thought in Aristotle, Stanley Rosen slips too easily 
between touch and grasp as he appeals to the touch of the hand to understand the power 
of touch in Aristotle. See Stanley Rosen, “Thought and Touch, a Note on Aristotle’s De 
Anima,” Phronesis 6 (1961), 127–137. A good account of the elusive nature of touch itself, 
which is “distinctive in its degree of heterogeneity,” can be found in Matthew Ratcliffe, 
“What Is Touch?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90/3 (2011), 413–432, here: pp. 16–17.
31   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort (Evanston, 1968), 
p. 141. For a good discussion of Aristotle’s understanding of touch in relation to the idea of 
chiasmic intertwining in Merleau-Ponty, see Rebecca Steiner Goldner, “Touch and Flesh 
in Aristotle’s De Anima,” Epoché 15/2 (2011), 439–440. 
32   Aristotle, De Anima, 415a16–22.
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the objects with which it operates are less obvious than are those of the other 
powers of the soul. Even so, however, in the chapters leading to his explicit 
accounts of taste and touch, the power of touch refuses to remain submerged, 
for it appears again first when Aristotle speaks of the impossibility for pow-
ers of perceiving to be deceived by their proper objects and then again in the 
discussion of hearing, when metaphors of touch lend texture to the nature of 
hearing itself.33 Further, when Aristotle speaks of the inferior nature of smell 
in humans as opposed to other animals, touch comes again to the surface as 
the power of perceiving in which human beings excel. Even in the chapter on 
seeing, the power of touch makes itself felt.
The connection between seeing and touch comes most poignantly to lan-
guage when Aristotle seeks to uncover the medium through which the power 
of seeing necessarily operates. Although he speaks neither of touch nor of 
contact here, Aristotle insists that “if one puts something having color up 
against the eye itself, it will not be seen.”34 This is offered, indeed, as a “clear 
sign [σηµεῖον . . . φανερόν]” that color, the proper object of the power to see, 
is in fact only seen through a transparent medium. Aristotle thus criticizes 
Democritus, who he says “does not speak beautifully [οὐ γὰρ καλῶς . . . λέγει]” 
when he supposes that what is between, τὸ µεταξύ, is empty.35 The very capac-
ity to see can be destroyed by touch; and yet, the medium through which vision 
encounters the visible is itself a matter of touch. Seeing is a kind of touching 
and being touched.
Thus Aristotle speaks of vision in terms first of continuous motion, then 
of a certain passion. He begins by saying, “color moves that which is transpar-
ent [τὸ διαφανές], such as air, and by this, if it is continuous [συνεχοῦς ὄντος], 
the sense organ is moved.”36 Continuity, in the Metaphysics, is said to occur 
“whenever the limit of two things that are touching and held together become 
one and the same.”37 The medium seems, thus, to be of decisive importance 
for Aristotle’s account of the distal powers of perceiving precisely because it 
puts the perceived object in touch with the perceiving organ in a way that does 
33   Aristotle, De Anima, 418a13–4 and 420b1–4.
34   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a12–13.
35   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a15–16.
36   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a13–15.
37   Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1068b26–1069a18. For a discussion of this passage, see Christopher 
P. Long, “The Ontological Reappropriation of Phronesis,” Continental Philosophy Review 
35/1 (2002), 35–60, here: p. 59 (n36). The language used there of a kind of touching that 
“reduces difference to the same” lacked a certain nuance that might here be gained by a 
more sophisticated account of touch and the nature of the medium.
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not destroy the organ itself. The medium ensures a gentle touch. The touching 
endemic to seeing is further articulated as a kind of being-acted upon. Already 
in De Anima II.5, where he seeks to articulate “what is common to all perceiv-
ing,” Aristotle had offered an important and nuanced account of perceiving 
as a certain way of being acted upon that does not involve alteration, or as 
Aristotle’s Greek expresses more adequately, “ἀλλοίωσις,” “becoming-other.”38 
Being acted upon in its most familiar sense involves becoming-other inso-
far as it makes what is acted upon different from what it was prior to being 
affected. Aristotle goes to some lengths to delineate a different sort of affec-
tion to describe the passion of perceiving, for when a perceiving organ is 
acted upon by its object, it does not become other, but rather, it settles into 
what it most characteristically is.39 The encounter between the visible object 
and the organ of vision is said to involve a kind of “συνεχής,” a way of “hold-
ing together,” because the activity of perceiving is itself an active condition 
of the soul, a ἕξις, that involves a power of the soul “holding together” with 
its object. Aristotle calls this activity of “holding together,” “τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι,” to 
be perceived to. The awkward English here is designed to suggest the man-
ner in which the articular infinitive in Greek expresses itself in the middle 
voice. The activity of perceiving is middle voiced in a definitive way, for it 
involves the activity and receptivity of the power of perceiving and the per-
ceived object both.40 Perceiving points to a dynamic and reciprocal way of 
being together with the perceived world.
For the power of seeing, what Aristotle calls the medium, τὸ µεταξύ, accom-
plishes the middle voiced activity that is perceiving itself by enabling the 
proper object of vision to touch the organ of vision without destroying it. 
Aristotle thus responds to Democritus’s insistence that there is a void between 
vision and the visible this way:
For seeing comes into being when what is capable of perceiving is acted 
upon by something, and because it is not possible for it to be acted upon 
38   See Aristotle, De Anima, 416b32–3 and 417b5–7, respectively. For a discussion of this, see 
Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, pp. 121–127.
39   For a discussion of ἕξις as a kind of settling into itself, καθίστασθαι, see Long, Aristotle on 
the Nature of Truth, pp. 123–127. See too Aristotle, Physics, 247b17–18.
40   The legomenology of τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι found in De Anima II.5 is rooted in the articulation 
of perceiving in the middle voice. See Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, p. 122. Welsch 
does a nice job of emphasizing the importance of the expression “τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι,” see 
Wolfgang Welsch, Aisthesis: Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre 
(Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 103–104.
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by the color itself that is seen, what remains is that it is acted upon by 
the medium [τὸ µεταξύ], so that it is necessary that there be something 
between [ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι µεταξύ]. And if what is in between were 
to become empty, it is not that nothing would be seen with precision, but 
nothing would  be seen at all.41
The very possibility of seeing depends upon the medium through which the 
organ of seeing can be acted upon, indeed, touched, in a way that enables 
the “holding together” that is perceiving. The things Democritus had said are 
not beautiful because they fail to account for the possibility of perceiving. 
Aristotle thus articulates his own position both in response to the things previ-
ously said and in an effort to more beautifully account for the phenomenon of 
perceiving itself. His account is designed to apply to all powers of perceiving 
in common, yet the need for a medium, so decisive for the distal powers, is 
less clear with regard to taste and touch. Here again the aporia of touch makes 
itself felt; for Aristotle insists that “the same account [ὁ δ᾽αὐτὸς λόγος] exists 
for sound and smell, for no sound or smell produces perception when touch-
ing the sense organ, but by the motion of sound and smell, the medium is set 
in motion, and by this the sense organs of each are moved.”42 Turning then, 
however, to touch and taste, Aristotle modifies his language slightly, speaking 
no longer of the “same” account, but saying rather, “[c]oncerning touch and 
taste it holds similarly [ὁµοίως], but this is not apparent; the reason for this 
will be clear later.”43 The aporia of touch comes to language in the shift from 
“the same” to “the similar.” Aristotle sees it. He recognizes too that it will con-
cern the nature and meaning of “τὸ µεταξύ,” the medium. But here he simply 
touches upon it only to set it quickly aside so that his attempt to articulate a 
common account of the powers of perceiving oriented primarily by the experi-
ence of sight is not derailed.
Yet in delineating the manner in which touch is already at work in the 
account of seeing, we are able to see, or perhaps better, to hear, the manner 
in which touch itself is integrated into the common account of perceiving. 
Although, as Golluber has suggested (see footnote 65), the De Anima is the 
“battleground” for the supremacy disputed by sight and touch, this apparent 
battle itself appears only on the surface of Aristotle’s account, for the deeper 
truth is that seeing is sublime because it always involves a kind of touching. 
There is no battle here, only the intimate cooperation of the powers of the soul 
41   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a17–21.
42   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a25–28.
43   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a30–31.
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and the objects that appear to them. The manner in which touch makes itself 
felt in the things Aristotle says about the other proper powers of perceiving 
suggests this intimate connection.
If touch has already been seen to be integrated into Aristotle’s account of 
seeing, metaphors of touch are heard as Aristotle seeks to articulate the nature 
of hearing itself. Here again, Aristotle speaks of a certain “holding together,” 
a “συνέχεια,” by way of which hearing is accomplished, for “what is capable of 
sounding is that which is able to move air that is one in continuity [συνεχείᾳ] 
until it reaches that which hears.”44 Yet with hearing, Aristotle amplifies the 
connection with touch yet further, suggesting explicitly that we may under-
stand the way differences in sound operate on the ear by appealing to meta-
phors of touch:
These [differences] are spoken of according to metaphors from tan-
gible things [λέγεται κατὰ µεταφορὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν], for the sharp tone 
moves the perceiving organ much in little time, while the flat tone moves 
it a little in much time [. . .] this seems to have an analogy to the sharp and 
the blunt that concern touch, for the sharp is the sort of thing that stabs, 
but the blunt is the sort that presses.45
Attending to the metaphors of tangible things allows Aristotle to sharpen 
his account of how sharp and flat tones are heard. The metaphors carry the 
things said of touch over to hearing, further accentuating the manner in 
which the power of hearing involves certain motions of the medium of air 
as it touches the ear, settling it into its own activity: the hearing of “sharp” 
and “flat” tones. The words themselves hint at this connection; and Aristotle 
draws upon them as he himself seeks to bring the nature of hearing to 
language.46
Touch manifests itself in Aristotle’s account of smell as well, for there it is 
said to be analogous to taste, which itself is called “a certain type of touch.”47 
But the analogy with taste is mentioned as a way of connecting smell, which 
44   Aristotle, De Anima, 420a3–4.
45   Aristotle, De Anima, 420a29–b2.
46   The tongue too plays an important role in this chapter on hearing, for Aristotle here 
addresses the nature of voice, which is said to involve making a noise with the tongue, 
though one that is said to “have soul in it and some sort of φαντασία” (Aristotle, De Anima, 
420b26–421a1).
47   Aristotle, De Anima, 421a19.
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Aristotle considers to be the most imprecise power of human perceiving, with 
touch, which he considers our most precise perceptive capacity. Thus, he says:
For with respect to the other powers of perceiving, the human-being is 
left behind by many of the animals, but with respect to touch, the human 
is precise in a way that greatly surpasses other animals, and this is why 
the human is the most practically wise [φρονιµώτατον] of the animals.48
The suggestion that human-beings are most practically wise because of our 
excellent capacity to touch opens the possibility that a more nuanced account 
of touch itself might teach us something about the nature of our ethical and 
political practices.49 Yet it also suggests that Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις 
might teach us something about the nature of touch. This avenue of inves-
tigation becomes yet more promising when it is recalled that the power of 
perceiving itself is understood to be a kind of ἕξις, or active condition of the 
48   Aristotle, De Anima, 421a20–23.
49   It is remarkable that Aristotle would associate touch, the most animalistic of our powers 
of perceiving, with a superlative capacity for φρόνησις, an intellectual virtue that seems 
quintessentially human. As Jaeger has suggested in some detail, the term “φρόνησις” had 
with Socrates been associated with ethical reasoning, while in Plato it took on a more 
theoretical meaning. See Werner W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His 
Development (Oxford, 1948), pp. 81–84. Without endorsing his developmental theory, 
we can agree that in Aristotle, the valence of the term vacillates, pointing sometimes to 
a general capacity for intellection and sometimes to the more technical, ethico-politi-
cal meaning developed in the Nicomachean Ethics. Whatever its specific valence here, 
the formulation “φρονιµώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων,” suggests that non-human animals share 
in a certain kind of φρόνησις. This idea is not unprecedented in Aristotle; for in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, where the term clearly has an ethico-political meaning, Aristotle 
notes that people “also say that some animals are practically wise [φρόνιµα], however 
many appear to be able to have foresight about their own lives” (Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1141a26–8). Lennox suggests that the difference between human character and the 
character of other animals lies in the fact that the “other animals do not need to integrate 
practical intelligence with natural virtues to achieve excellence of character.” See James 
G. Lennox, “Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue,” in Biology and the Foundation of 
Ethics, eds. Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (Cambridge/New York, 1999), pp. 10–31, 
here: p. 13. Nothing in the argument developed here depends on ascribing a certain kind 
of φρόνησις to non-human animals. Rather, what is important from a legomenological per-
spective is the way the appearance of this word φρονιµώτατον in this context invites us to 
consider what Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις might teach us about touch and vice versa.
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soul analogous to φρόνησις and the other intellectual and ethical excellences.50 
Further, in the Nicomachean Ethics, ethical virtue is said to be “an active 
 condition for the ability to choose, being in a mean condition [µεσότητι] in 
relation to us, determined by a ratio [λόγος] and by the means by which a 
 practically wise person would determine it.”51 Virtue here involves a certain 
feel for the right thing as discerned by the person with φρόνησις. As a “mean 
condition relative to us,” ethical excellence is conditioned at once by the sit-
uation encountered and by the nature of the one encountering it. Practical 
wisdom is a cultivated ability to discern what is good and bad in a given con-
text, and the person with practical wisdom must be well disposed toward the 
mean between vices on the extremes. Thus, in a sense, the person with practi-
cal wisdom is like someone with a healthy, well functioning capacity to taste. 
As Charles de Konnick has suggested, taste “is the sense of wisdom, the sense 
of ‘sapientia’ [from ‘sapere,’ to savour].”52 Thus, when Aristotle turns his atten-
tion to taste, as he does immediately after his discussion of smell where the 
question of practical wisdom first emerges, he intimates that the tongue must 
be in a kind of mean condition between the dry and the moist if it is to be 
capable of tasting. Although he does not yet use the vocabulary of the mean, 
τὸ µέσον, he points out that with taste, “there is nothing that is the medium [τὸ 
µεταξύ],” and suggests that “. . . the tongue does not perceive when it is dried 
out or too moist.”53 The implication that the tongue itself must be in a kind of 
mean condition to perceive well seems confirmed when Aristotle appeals to 
the example of a sick person whose ability to taste is compromised: “all things 
appear bitter to sick people because they perceive them with a tongue full of 
that sort of moisture.”54 To be capable of discerning well the taste of things, the 
tongue must be in a healthy mean condition, just as the person with practical 
wisdom, in order to choose well, must have cultivated a sense for virtue; for as 
Aristotle puts it in the Nicomachean Ethics, ethical virtue is “a certain kind of 
mean condition [µεσότης], since it is, at any rate, something that makes one 
apt to hit the mean [τοῦ µέσου].”55 Here, however, a decisive but subtle shift 
50   For an account of why the intellectual and ethical habits in Aristotle must be understood 
in relation to one another, see James G. Lennox, “Aristotle on the Biological Roots of 
Virtue,” p. 13.
51   Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b36–1107a2.
52   Charles de Konnick, “ ‘Sedeo Ergo Sum’ Considerations on the Touchstone of Certitude,” 
Laval Theologique et Philosophique VI/2 (1950), 343–348, here: p. 348.
53   Aristotle, De Anima, 422a15–16 and 422b5–6.
54   Aristotle, De Anima, 422b8–10.
55   Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b27–28. Aristotle emphasizes that virtue, ἀρετή, has a 
double function, for it not only brings the person with it into a good condition, but also 
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is already intimated, one that will find more explicit articulation as Aristotle 
turns his attention to the power of touch and its enigmatic medium, τὸ µεταξύ, 
which has to this point failed adequately to appear.
3 The Power of Touch
Here in the middle, the inquiry into the nature of the soul confronts the aporia 
of touch that threatens to disperse the experience of perceiving, rendering it 
different for each power. Though it has taken him time to come to it, when 
Aristotle turns his full attention to touch, he does not turn away from its apo-
retic nature. Here the question of the medium gains in urgency as Aristotle 
rehearses what Derrida has called “the manifold aporia of touch.”56 “There is 
an impasse [ἀπορίαν],” Aristotle says, “as to whether [touch is] many or one, 
and what indeed is the perceptual organ of the ability to touch, whether it 
is flesh [σάρξ] or something analogous to this in other animals, or not, but the 
flesh is the medium [τὸ µεταξύ], while the first perceptual organ is something 
other inside.”57 Already here, the proper boundary between the touching ani-
mal and the touchable world begins to feel porous; and this permeability also 
seems to introduce a deeper cleavage between the distal and the contact pow-
ers of perceiving; for not only is the medium aporetic, but touch seems to have 
neither a proper organ nor a proper object.
To illustrate the difficulty in identifying a proper organ of touch, Aristotle 
shrouds the flesh itself in an imaginary membrane so as to suggest that even 
so shrouded the animate body would immediately feel itself being touched.58 
The organ of touch thus seems to recede into the body itself, while its medium, 
makes the person capable of acting well. Thus, Aristotle writes: “It is necessary to say that 
every virtue both brings that of which it is the virtue into completion and a good condi-
tion and also renders the work it does well done, as the excellence of the eye makes both 
the eye and its work excellent [σπουδαῖος], since by means of the excellence of the eye we 
see well.” See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a15–19. Chrétien recognizes the tight con-
nection between tangible perceiving and the ethical mean: “The mean that we are is the 
measure of extremes, discerning extremes and differentiating them: the hot is always hot-
ter than us, the cold what is colder than our flesh, and similarly for the hard and the soft 
(De anima, II, 11, and Meteorology, IV, 4, 382A 17–21 [. . .]). What is like us is not perceived; 
we feel only what exceeds us . . . Here as in ethics, the mean is a form of excellence.” See 
Chrétien, The Call and the Response, pp. 99–100.
56   Derrida, On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy, pp. 4–5.
57   Aristotle, De Anima, 422b19–23.
58   Aristotle, De Anima, 423a2–4.
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τὸ µεταξύ, is said to “grow organically upon” the body.59 This intimacy of the 
medium seems also to blur the boundaries between taste and touch; for 
the tongue “perceives everything tangible with the same part that perceives 
flavor.”60 The tongue, organ of taste, is also, as flesh, the medium of touch.61 
Thus, the power of touch threatens to subvert a coherent and unified account 
of the powers of perceiving in which the organ, the medium and the object are 
each properly delineated and mapped onto their proper powers of perceiving.
This unified account is further threatened by yet another aporia associ-
ated with the medium of touch. Extending the thought experiment of the 
shrouded body to all manner of elements, Aristotle imagines a world in which 
touch is impossible because there is always something in-between, be it water 
or air. In such a world, touch too would be a distal power of perceiving. This 
leads him directly to consider the question of the unity of the account of the 
proper powers: “So is the perception of all things similar, or is it different for dif-
ferent powers of perceiving, just as now it seems that taste and touch perceive 
by contact, but the others from a distance?”62 The coherence of the account 
comes here to poignant crisis, and Aristotle confronts the possibility that each 
power of perceiving might operate in its own peculiar way. His response, how-
ever, is to decisively deny that the powers of perceiving are fundamentally dif-
ferent, but in so doing, he brings to language an understanding of the medium 
that further fleshes out the nature of perceiving itself. To the possibility that 
perceiving is different for different perceptive powers, Aristotle says:
59   Aristotle, De Anima, 423a15–16. Aristotle writes: ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον τὸ σῶµα εἶναι τὸ µεταξὺ τοῦ 
ἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκός.
60   Aristotle, De Anima, 423a17–18.
61   Aristotle calls the tongue the “most tactile” [ἁπτικωτάτη] of organs, and suggests in the 
Parts of Animals that the flesh of the human tongue, because it is the softest, broadest 
and most detached, enables us not only to communicate with one another by articulate 
speech, but also renders humans “the most acutely perceptive [εὐαισθητότατος] of the 
other animals” (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 660a11–25). The translation of “εὐαισθητότατος” 
as “most acutely perceptive” attempts to articulate the appearance of the prefix “εὐ-” in 
terms that express the excellence of touch. Contemporary science has fleshed this out fur-
ther, affirming that the highest densities of mechanoreceptors, those sensory nerve end-
ings that convert mechanical energy into electrical signals in which the central nervous 
system traffics, “are found in the tongue, lips, palms, fingertips, nipples, clitoris, and the 
tip of the penis, accounting for the extraordinary sensitivity of these parts of the body.” 
See Sachs, “The Intimate Sense,” p. 28.
62   Aristotle, De Anima, 423b1–3.
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But this is not so, but we perceive even the hard and the soft through 
other things, just as we perceive what is able to make a sound or a sight 
or a smell; but the latter from far away, and the former from nearby, and 
thus it escapes our notice; since we perceive them all through a mean 
[τοῦ µέσου], but in the former case it escapes notice.63
A truth of perceiving that ought not to escape our notice comes to language 
here with the subtle shift of vocabulary from τὸ µεταξύ, the medium, to τὸ 
µέσον, the mean.64 Michael Golluber touches upon it when he suggests “Mesou, 
which is ambiguous enough to suggest something like ‘medium,’ more pre-
cisely means ‘mean,’ lending an element of the cognitive to what otherwise 
appears to be a merely physical or mechanical account.”65 The element of the 
cognitive to which Golluber appeals here might perhaps better be said to be 
a dimension of discernment endemic to perceiving itself; for this its critical 
capacity is what ultimately marks the difference between other living things 
with the capacity for nourishment and animals who have in addition the per-
ceptive ability to reach out to a world that presents itself as desirable.
The aporia of touch has led Aristotle to speak of “the medium” as a kind of 
“mean,” thus lending voice to the middle voiced dynamic of perceiving itself. 
Already in the discussion of seeing, the medium was seen to be decisive; for 
Aristotle had said that Democritus had not spoken beautifully when he claimed 
there was nothing between the visible object and the power of vision. There 
Aristotle had insisted that “it is necessary that there be something between 
63   Aristotle, De Anima, 423b4–8.
64   For the sake of clarity, we have consistently translated τὸ µεταξύ, as the “medium,” 
although it fails to capture the manner in which Aristotle places a definite article in front 
of an adverb in order to thematize the nature of what is “between.” We have translated 
the “between” as “medium” to more effectively capture the manner which Aristotle seems 
use the term when he is thinking of the relationship of perceiving in material terms. Here, 
however, τὸ µέσον is translated as “the mean,” although it can mean whatever is between 
things. This allows us to reserve “the mean condition” for µεσότης, the noun associated 
with substantive adjective, τὸ µέσον. Polansky recognizes that µέσον “seems the wider 
term for whatever is between things, whereas the former [µεσότης] is something between 
extremes and somehow just right or appropriate.” See Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, 
p. 333. Polansky and Welton render µέσον as “intermediate” and µεσότης as “mean.” See 
William Welton and Ronald Polansky, “The Viability of Virtue in the Mean,” Apeiron 25/4 
(1992), 79–102, here: p. 90 (n15).
65   Michael Golluber, “Aristotle on Knowledge and the Sense of Touch,” Journal of 
Philosophical Research 26 (2001), 655–680, here: p. 668.
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[ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι µεταξύ].”66 But here it now seems that Aristotle there 
did not himself speak beautifully, for in criticizing Democritus, Aristotle seems 
to have overemphasized the “something” that exists between the power of per-
ceiving and the thing perceived. By focusing on the quality of what fills the gap 
between them, he was unable to articulate how they hold themselves toward 
one another. The shift from “the medium” to “the mean,” from “τὸ µεταξύ” to 
“τὸ µέσον,” enables Aristotle to bring the nature of perceiving to language in 
relational rather than material terms.67
Even if, however, Aristotle here speaks of “the mean” as he attempts to 
articulate a path through the aporia of the medium, he continues to speak of 
“the medium” in order to reinforce the similarity between tangible, visible and 
audible things even as he notes a difference:
But tangible things do differ from visible and audible things, for we per-
ceive the latter when the medium acts upon us in some way, but the tan-
gible things not by the medium [ὑπὸ τοῦ µεταξύ] but at the same time as 
the medium [ἅµα τῷ µεταξύ], just as someone who is struck through a 
shield; for it is not that the shield, being struck, beats upon one, but at the 
same time both together [ἅµ᾽ ἄµφω συνέβη] are struck.68
The shield example evokes again the thought experiment of the membrane 
tightly joined to the body. Here, as there, the intimacy of the medium is 
emphasized; for both together are struck. Here, however, the little word ἅµα 
further reinforces the intimacy of touch with a term that means “together” and 
“at once” and thus articulates a mode of relation that is, strictly speaking, nei-
ther spatial nor temporal, because simultaneously at the root of both. Derrida 
has beautifully suggested as much with reference to the appearance of this 
small word, ἅµα, in the context of Aristotle’s account of time: “This locution is 
first neither spatial nor temporal. The duplicity of the simul to which it refers 
66   Aristotle, De Anima, 419a20.
67   Polansky recognizes this when he writes: “The sensitive mean is not a quality but a rela-
tion like either health or virtue depending upon whether we look toward the sense organ 
or sense.” See, Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 333. Marjolein Oele, citing Plessner’s De 
Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, connects this relational aspect of Aristotle’s 
understanding of touch to Plessner’s conception of “positionality”—“the relationship 
that a living being has to its environment by ‘arising in it, depending on it, yet oppos-
ing itself to it.’ ” See Marjolein Oele, “Being Beyond: Aristotle’s and Plessner’s Accounts of 
Animal Responsiveness,” in Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal: At the Limits of 
Experience, eds. Corinne Painter and Christian Lotz (Dordrecht, 2007), p. 33.
68   Aristotle, De Anima, 423b12–17.
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does not yet reassemble, within itself, either points or now, places or phases. It 
says the complicity, the common origin of time and space, appearing together 
as the condition for all appearing of Being.”69 Although Aristotle returns to the 
talk of “the medium” in this passage about the shield, the appearance of the 
little word, ἅµα, and indeed, its repetition to reinforce the manner in which 
the medium is together with that which is capable of feeling, suggest that the 
intimacy of touch has uncovered the conditions according to which perceiving 
itself unfolds. The reciprocal and chiasmic nature of perceiving has thus come 
to language in the subtle shift in locution from the medium to the mean, and 
in the articulation of the little word, ἅµα, which together give voice to a way of 
being together Aristotle himself calls, “τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι,” to be perceived to. The 
itinerary of touch has led us to the heart of perceiving.
4 The Heuristics of Touch
Although Aristotle has touched upon the nature of perceiving as a kind of 
mean, he continues to speak of the medium in order to reinforce the unity of 
the proper powers of perceiving. Thus, before turning his attention to perceiv-
ing as such, Aristotle reaffirms that touch and taste function in the same man-
ner as sight, hearing and smell; for with the contact powers too, “no perception 
would come into being, if the perceptual organ were touched.”70 If touch is to 
operate like the other powers of perceiving, the organ will need to be located 
inside the body and the flesh itself must be said to be the medium, τὸ µεταξύ.71 
The locution of the medium reappears here and in the passage on the shield 
so as to reinscribe the power of touch into the community of the other proper 
powers of perceiving.
69   Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago, 1982), p. 56. Derrida goes on in this pas-
sage to insist that Aristotle does not say this, but he “develops his demonstration in the 
unnoticed self-evidence of what the locution hama says. He says it without saying it, lets 
it say itself, or rather, it lets him say what he says.” Thus Derrida says, without saying it, 
something decisive about legomenology; for by attending carefully to “the unnoticed self-
evidence of what the locution [. . .] says,” Derrida is able to discern in the things Aristotle 
says something of the truth of what is said. That truth itself emerges precisely because 
Aristotle seeks assiduously to put words to things in ways that do justice to those things.
70   Aristotle, De Anima, 423b20–21.
71   Aristotle, De Anima, 423b23–26. A very accessible and rather beautiful account of the 
organ of touch can be found in the discussion of the epidermis and the dermis in Diane 
Ackerman, A Natural History of the Senses (Vintage, 1991), pp. 83–84. For more on the 
physiognomy of touch, see Sachs, “The Intimate Sense.”
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Yet the intimacy of touch teaches us about the dynamics of perceiving in a 
way that the other proper powers of perceiving do not. Thus, at the end of the 
chapter, Aristotle returns to the question of perceiving where its nature as a 
discriminating power is touched upon and the full significance of the talk of 
the mean can be felt. Listen first to how perceiving is here said:
For the to be perceived to is a certain being acted upon; with the result 
that what produces makes another thing, being in potency, the sort of 
thing that what produces is in activity [τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι 
εἰστίν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάµει ὄν].72
The passage brings to language the poetics of perceiving. To be perceived to 
involves a kind of poiesis in the middle voice, a suffering as much as a making. 
We have encountered already perceiving as a peculiar kind of passion, for it is 
not the standard passion of alteration in which what is changed becomes other 
than it was, but rather, the sort of being-affected in which what is affected 
comes into its own being-at-work. Thus, what produces the perception is here 
said to make that which has the capacity to encounter it the sort of thing that 
what produces already is. The power of perceiving and the thing perceived 
become one in the activity of perceiving itself. The result clause shows this 
in the very manner in which it is declared.73 That which produces is said first 
to be itself of such a sort in its being at work (τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ); the 
power of perceiving is, at the end of the clause, still yet in potency (δυνάµει 
ὄν); in the middle is the poetics of perceiving by which that which produces 
the perception makes the power of perceiving the sort of thing the perceived 
thing is (τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ). The manner in which the passage is articulated 
shows what had been already said in De Anima II.5: “And the ability to per-
ceive is in potency such as the perceived thing is already [ἤδη] in its being-
at-work-staying-itself.”74 The little word “ἤδη”, “already,” expresses the manner 
in which what is perceived itself does not, in being perceived, become other 
than it has always already been. However, the poetics of perceiving is itself 
said to involve a “certain being acted upon” in the middle voice, suggesting 
that the perceived thing too undergoes a certain passion. The account of touch 
already intimated as much by its recognition that what is tangible acts upon 
72   Aristotle, De Anima, 424a1–2.
73   The term “declare” here is meant to express the Greek λόγος ἀποφαντικός, or the kind of 
speaking that addresses things by allowing them to show themselves as themselves. For 
an account of this sense of declaration, see Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 72–76.
74   Aristotle, De Anima, 418a3–4.
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the medium and the power of tangibility at the same time. There can be no 
delusion of pure objectivity with touch, for the power of touch puts us in touch 
with the object touched itself. This encounter always involves an ineluctable 
dimension of force. As Hans Jonas has suggested: “the contact-situation always 
involves  pressure and therefore a modicum of force as part of the experience.”75 
Even so, however, in touch that which is perceived relinquishes something of 
itself to us; we are made to perceive the sort of thing it already is.
Thus, the capacity to perceive is no mere passivity; rather, the power of per-
ceiving itself is an active condition of the soul, a kind of ἕξις that embodies an 
ἦθος, or character. When, as he seeks to articulate the nature of touch, Aristotle 
himself touches upon perceiving as a mean, he gives voice to the very ethics 
of perceiving. Through the aporia of touch, we are made to feel the extent to 
which perceiving is itself a habituated power of the soul. If perceiving is the 
most primal way animals inhabit the world, in touch we animals feel ourselves 
habituated to the world. Thus, although Aristotle has been criticized for failing 
to articulate the active side of touch, what the contemporary psychology of 
touch calls “haptics,” nevertheless, with his talk of the mean, Aristotle brings 
the active dimension of touch to language.76 Listen:
For we do not perceive [οὐκ αἰσθανόµεθα] that which is as hot or cold, or 
hard or soft, as we are, but what exceeds us [τῶν ὑπερβολῶν]; for the power 
of perceiving is a kind of mean condition [µεσότητος] being between the 
contrary attributes in the things perceived. And because of this, it dis-
cerns the things perceived. The mean is capable of discernment, for it 
comes to be either of the two extremes in relation to the other.77
As a mean condition between extreme attributes in things perceived, the 
hyperbolic power of touch reaches out toward tangible things with an open-
ness capable of discernment. The hyperbolic openness of touch is a kind of 
readiness to be affected in which the mean condition itself becomes the root 
75   Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology: Essays (New York, 
1966), p. 140.
76   As Cynthia Freeland rightly mentions, contemporary scientists use the term ‘haptics’ to 
refer to the active dimension of touch. See Cynthia A. Freeland, “Aristotle on the Sense 
of Touch,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford, 1995), p. 236. James J. Gibson traces 
the vocabulary of “haptics” to the work of G. Revesz on the psychology of the blind, and 
makes the distinction between active (haptic) and passive touch central to his psycholog-
ical account of touch. See James J. Gibson, “Observations on Active Touch,” Psychological 
Review 69/6 (1962), 477–491.
77   Aristotle, De Anima, 424a2–7.
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of the possibility of discernment.78 As we have heard, the tongue is perhaps 
the best illustration of this; for not only does everything taste bitter to the 
sick  person due to an excess of bitter moisture, but also, as the most tactile 
of organs, the tongue is best able to discern the hot and cold, hard and soft. 
Indeed, as infants, we find our original way into the world largely through our 
capacity to touch with our tongue.
What we discern in reaching out to the world, however, is that the world 
itself presses palpably back upon us, makes itself felt, habituating us to it 
through touch.79 Aristotle’s emphasis on the hyperbolic dimension of perceiv-
ing suggests that as a mean condition, the power of perceiving is able to per-
ceive what is unlike itself, discerning this as hot only when the temperature 
of the perceiving being is cooler than that which is perceived. This suggests 
too, however, that as a mean condition perceiving acclimates us to the world 
in which we live. Here again the power of touch is felt, though perhaps only in 
the absence of feeling; consider, for example, the manner in which your finger 
no longer feels the wedding ring already after only a few months of marriage, 
or how your body slowly adjusts to the jolting cold of the ocean water.80 We get 
used to it. The world makes itself felt, habituates us to it even as we continue to 
reach out toward the world, perceiving that which presents itself as sufficiently 
different from us to activate our perceptive powers.
Here our ability to find our way in the world, our very proprioception—the 
manner in which we orient our body in the world—is itself conditioned by the 
reciprocal activity of perceiving in which we reach out to a world receptive to 
our active capacities to perceive even as the world presses itself upon our per-
ceptive capacities to receive it.81 Perceiving operates in the middle voice. As a 
mean condition, the power of perceiving is the peculiar way we animals hold 
78   Polansky rightly speaks of this openness endemic to the mean as a kind of relation as 
opposed to a quality. See Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 333.
79   Barad puts it this way: “Touch moves and affects what it effects.” See Barad, “On 
Touching—The Inhuman That Therefore I Am,” p. 208.
80   To illustrate this phenomenon Ackerman appeals to the example of how a wool sweater 
feels scratchy when we first put it on but “after a while, a touch receptor ‘adapts’ to the 
stimuli and stops responding”; we get used to it and no longer notice the sweater we are 
wearing. See Ackerman, A Natural History of the Senses, p. 81.
81   Ratcliffe rightly brings touch into tight connection with proprioception: “If we adopt a 
phenomenological conception of touch, a distinction between proprioception and touch 
is, I think, untenable. Touch, extricated from proprioception, would be so impoverished 
as to bear little resemblance to the rich and heterogeneous phenomenology integral to 
tactile experience.” See Matthew Ratcliffe, “Touch and Situatedness,” International Journal 
of Philosophical Studies 16/3 (2008), p. 302. 
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ourselves toward and with the world. Touch, the most primal power of per-
ceiving, enables us to feel the contours of the power of perceiving itself, which 
never comes to language in the vernacular of the grasp. The hand, indeed, 
is conspicuously absent from Aristotle’s account of touch where the tongue 
emerges as its most proper site.82
Thus, in the end, after touching upon the nature of the imagination 
and thinking in De Anima III, Aristotle returns in the final two chapters to 
the question of touch, reaffirming it primal significance for animal life. There 
again, he speaks of the mean and the earth and of the contraries that make 
up the elements of things:
For touch exists as a mean condition [µεσότης] of all tangible things, and 
its perceptual organ is receptive not only of the various differences there 
are of the earth, but also of hot and of cold and of all the other tangible 
things.83
Touch inhabits the space between the living animal and the earth in which we 
live, putting us in touch with the very elements of things, enabling us to find 
nourishment and flee danger. As a mean condition situated between the living 
animal and the life world, touch empowers us to discern the world as it presses 
itself upon us and impresses us with the vast diversity of its beauty and the 
swiftness with which it slips away. If, as Aristotle reminds us at the end, with-
out touch it is impossible for the animal to live, still it is through touch that the 
82   Aristotle famously likens the soul to a hand which “is the tool of tools [ὄργανόν ἐστιν 
ὀργάνων].” See Aristotle, De Anima, 432a1–2. Chrétien identifies “fingering” with the capac-
ities of the hand to explore the contours of the felt world. Fingering, which Chrétien says 
is a uniquely human capacity, is not a matter of grasping, but of feeling. In this sense, 
fingering is the hand’s way of being more like the tongue. Even so, the hand is always too 
easily tempted to grasp. (However tempted the tongue may be, grasping is not a capac-
ity given to it.) Although the distinction between fingering and grasping is missing from 
Rosen’s account of touch in Aristotle, nevertheless, Rosen well articulates the tendency 
of the hand to possess, rather than to identify with its object: “The hand, in grasping the 
object, may be said to hold it, not to become it.” Rosen, “Thought and Touch, a Note on 
Aristotle’s De Anima,” p. 134. The concern there for Rosen is the distinction between the 
mind, which becomes its object, and the hand, which holds its object. Still, the hand’s con-
nection with conceptuality here, with what the Germans call Der Begriff—from begreifen, 
to grasp—cannot be denied. Aristotle’s account of touch avoids the logic of the concept 
and thus the economy of the grasp, obsessed as it is with possession. The incapacity of the 
tongue to grasp is precisely what makes it the proper site of touch for Aristotle.
83   Aristotle, De Anima, 435a21–24.
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other powers of perceiving enable us to live well in a world that forever slips 
from our grasp.84 And yet, in the end, as at the beginning, the tongue, the very 
flesh by which we find our way into the world, enables us to signify beautiful 
things to one another and thus to touch upon something of the truth the world 
itself articulates: that we belong to it as much as it belongs to us; that we are 
able to respond to and with the world and one another in ways that enrich 
both the world and the lives lived in it; and indeed, that by cultivating our 
capacities to touch, we might feel our way toward a more intimate connection 
with the elusive nature of life.
84   Aristotle, De Anima, 434b23–4.
